As the dust from the German elections settles and coalition negotiations begin, let’s take a look at what happened.

The election results reveal a striking shift in the country’s political landscape, most notably a surge in support for the far-right Alternative für Deutschland (AfD), which doubled its vote share to become the second-largest party in the Bundestag.

This result has sparked widespread debate, with many questioning what has fuelled this rise – the war in Ukraine, the cost-of-living crisis or a broader sense of disenfranchisement? One major factor that has come under scrutiny is demographics. Many blame younger voters for the decline in support for mainstream parties, with just one in four (25%) of 18-24 year-olds voting for the two parties that are now set to form the next government, and voters in the 30-44 age bracket contributing the highest share of votes to the far-right at 26%.

But is it really about age – or is there more going on?

Gender and education levels are much more important than age

While many have focused on age as a dividing line in this vote, it is important to note that a higher proportion of 18-24 year olds (25%) voted for Die Linke (Left Party) than for the AfD (21%). And both gender and education levels are much stronger indicators of voting behaviour than age. Men were 41% more likely to vote for the AfD than women.

And people with a “basic” level of education were more than twice as likely to vote for the far-right as people with a “higher” level of education.

A lot has been written about the disenfranchisement of men– and particularly young men –  in politics, including this recent op-ed in the UK’s The Observer newspaper.

The geographical divide and deprivation

Everyone who has been following the German elections has probably seen this map. The division between former East and West Germany is pretty stark. Despite years of investment and a solidarity tax (the so-called “Soli”) that West Germans pay to support the East, decades of inequality and slower economic growth in the East have left many feeling left behind. This division suggests that economic and social deprivation  – rather than demographics alone  – plays a crucial role in shaping political preferences.

A time of disillusionment

One of the more unexpected and underreported trends in this election was the movement of over 100,000 voters from the far-left Die Linke (Left Party) to the far-right AfD. So to what extent are people voting based on policies and politics, and to what extent is a broader sense of disenfranchisement and frustration with the political system driving voting patterns? Many of these voters may be casting a “veto vote,” driven by dissatisfaction with the status quo rather than wholehearted support for the far-right’s agenda.

This disillusionment is compounded by a lack of confidence in the centrist parties, with young people in particular, feeling that their concerns – whether about the economy, the climate crisis, or social justice – are not being adequately addressed by the political establishment.

But…

While it’s not all down to age, one thing is clear: mainstream parties – particularly the CDU and SPD – must do more to engage with younger voters. Disillusioned youth will continue to be a significant voting bloc in future elections, and without a compelling offer that addresses their concerns, these parties risk further losses. To remain relevant and counter the growing influence of the far-right, they must adapt their policies to meet the demands of a changing electorate and tackle the underlying issues of deprivation and frustration that have driven so many to the extremes of the political spectrum.